While googling for extra sources for this post, I found out that -while Clausewitz is credited with the phrase "fog of war"- he never used that term in On War.
Apparently the closest he came was mentioning "fog and friction." defined as "The diverse difficulties and impediments to the effective use of military force."
Whether Clausewitz actually used the phrase or not, the uncertainty of war was a consistent theme in his work: "In war, everything is very simple. But even the simplest things are very difficult."
Author/analyst Jim Dunnigan made an intereresting comment in his book From Shield to Storm (with Austin Bay) that during Desert Storm "for the first time, people all over the world could experience the pre-combat jitters" that every soldier does. But it isn't just jitters; the phrase "fog of war" delineates, in terse form, the terrible uncertainty implicit during any combat.
The recent action in Iraq has already been compared to Tet '68, but to my knowledge very few have compared Tet to an equally famous battle: the Ardennes offensive, also known as the Battle of the Bulge.
During that combat, thirty American divisions faced thirty German. Over a million men fought a month-long battle in one of the single greatest battles of the Second World War. Over 19,000 Americans died in that battle.
The parallels to Tet are instructive: both occured near the end of a war; both times the Allies were publicly confident of victory; both offensives were a surprise in terms of strength, center of gravity (schwerpunkt), and time of the attack. The main difference is that Tet was a (relatively) easier victory. It took the Allies a month to fight their way back to their original line in the Ardennes. In Vietnam it took less than two weeks, with certain notable exceptions such as Hue.
But (with the exception of works such as Band of Brothers) few mainstream works have focused on just how surprised the Allies were, and how chaotic the situation became for the Allies in WW2.
Alas, too few understand that warfare is, by its very nature, chaotic.
On December 16, 1944, Germany began what was originally termed a "counteroffensive," or spoiling attack, on American positions in the Schnee Eifel. Over 600,000 men swarmed against a front that had been deliberately thinned by SHAEF in order to concentrate on an anticipated attack to the northeast.
Several American divisions were severely damaged, and two were effectively destroyed. Tens of hundreds of American soldiers streamed back from the front in retreat. Not all were so discouraged. One rearward-advancing sergeant, seeing advancing tanks, jumped up on one and yelled "I joined the Army to fight, not retreat!" He had a lot of company in 1944.
There were quite a few rumors speeding about: German assassins targeting Eisenhower; enemy units crossing the Liege, and approaching Antwerp; German units in American uniforms, speaking English to introduce confusion. Eisenhower had to submit to a bodyguard in Paris...
Despite all this; despite the chaos, confusion, retreat and apparent defeat, the Allies went on to decimate German forces in the West. In fact, most observers agree that the Ardennes offensive shortened the war by eliminating a significant part of German offensive capability.
But you wouldn't have known that by reading the day by day wire reports during the second half of December, 1944. By all indications the Allies were facing an unmitigated disaster.
This is the central problem of any war: how to separate rumor from reality, fear from fact, and truth from trepidation. This is, in all actuality, the ultimate test of any leader; the ability to see clearly through the fog of war.
The reason I bring all this up, including the earlier reference to From Shield to Storm, is that it is now possible for citizens of a country to watch a war in near real-time.
While America experienced a foreshadowing of this during Vietnam, it was not until the Gulf War that voters could experience 24/7 coverage of war. We can all dredge up memories of the anxiety, fear, and (eventual) excitement that that war invoked.
Today that uncertainty has been raised to a considerable power. All we need to do is think back a year to the invasion of Iraq.
The pre-war predictions were all over the map: thousands of US dead; tens of thousands of Iraq dead; the "Arab Street" would wreak a terrible vengeance on America; US citizens worried about germ or chemical attacks, while people stocked up on duct tape, plastic covers for windows, and bottled water; Saddam Hussein would inflict tremendous coalition casualties, either with WMDs, or with street fighting in Baghdad, to reproduce "another Stalingrad." Or, alternatively, it would be a "cakewalk."
Despite all the predictions, the actual war managed to surprise. At first, coalition forces swept past all opposition in a "wave of steel," until the infamous pause that certainly didn't refresh! After that, the theme swung from "blitzkrieg" to "quagmire" in just a couple of days.
But still, after all that, three United States divisions managed to conquer an entire country within a few weeks. Even Guerdian would have been impressed.
The moral of the story? We could trot out some of the more hoary old chestnuts, such as "don't count your chickens before they're hatched," or (a favorite of Churchill's) "trees to not grow up to the sky," but that would miss the point.
I have to say the Jerry Pournelle said it best with "The trick is, the thing is: not to lose your head."
War is, by its very nature, a chaotic undertaking. And the recent study of Robert MacNamara (ironically titled "The Fog of War") shows the pitfalls of trying to apply deterministic planning to the Art of War.
What does this mean today? Simple. We have seen, during the past week in Iraq, public statements of absolute confidence as well as near-absolute despair. The latter is best exemplified by by the Not-Honorable Senator Byrd's recent "cut and run" speech.
The trick is, as the man said, "not to lose your head."
We need to win the war, before we start squabbling about winning the peace.
Fog of War, Part 2
Comments (7)
I read a very interesting book about the Battle of the Bulge years ago and if I remember correctly, the reason the Germans were initially so successful was the bad weather which prevented Allied air power from doing its part. Once the weather cleared, the tide of battle changed in a few hours. So I don't see how you can compare that to Iraq today.
Secondly, the reason Tet was such a big deal despite it being a military failure in the classical sense was that no one on our side thought the Viet Cong had that many troops and tanks (!) available in the first place. Remember, the pentagon kept giving us these kill numbers and everyone here figured the Viet Cong were going to run out of fighters soon.
The parallel with Iraq is that we have underestimated the number of Iraqui fighters ready to join in - we were led to believe that the Iraquis had all run away, and that most of the resistance was the work of foreign elements.
Posted by claude tessier | April 12, 2004 12:02 PM
Posted on April 12, 2004 12:02
Claude,
Well, as its turning out, it is the work of foreign elements...specifically, its becoming clear that Iran had a huge hand in getting Sadr's troops set up and organized; my view is that Sadr got off the Iranian ranch without permission (thus the Iranian's calls for an end to the fighting), but its pretty clear that Iran had nefarious designs on Iraq.
Once again, fog of war; of course, it'll be ten years before we get the full story of the Liberation of Iraq, but the one thing to keep clear in mind is that the US military of 2004 is not the US military of 1968 (its much, much better) and the US government is not the US government of 1968.
Posted by Mark Noonan | April 12, 2004 12:50 PM
Posted on April 12, 2004 12:50
The succes of the initial German attacks were not just a matter of the loss of air cover. The strikes came in a sector the allies thought was "quiet" and they never picked up on the German preparations. SO that was a legitimate intelligence failure.
Also, post-war Vietnamese histories confirm that the Pentagon's estimates of VC fighting strength were correct. The TET offensive was not evidence that the military underestimated their numbers. See the January 1995 issue of "Intelligence and National Security" which has a review essay on this specific topic.
Posted by craig henry | April 12, 2004 2:17 PM
Posted on April 12, 2004 14:17
Craig: I suppose "The TET offensive was not evidence that the military underestimated their numbers." can be understood in several ways. I was in high school at the time and not looking forward to being drafted. On the other hand, all the adults in my neighborhood were strongly pro-war. The only anti-war guy was my freshman social studies teacher who had served in Nam and had come home bitter about the incompetence of the officers leading our men, and blaming their incompetence for our high casualty rates. Our impression at the time was that the military - at least in the public announcements - had consistently underestimated the capabilities of the enemy and overestimated enemy casualties. If they knew the actual strength of the enemy but played down these numbers it makes it even worse.
Posted by claude tessier | April 12, 2004 3:50 PM
Posted on April 12, 2004 15:50
Casey,
I agree with your basic thesis about war's uncertainty. That痴 why I believe that those who resist it without clear necessity and the best plan and support possible are actually the ones who are strong on defense. But the analogy to Iraq seems weak. This ain稚 no war, it痴 an occupation.
Posted by shep | April 12, 2004 3:57 PM
Posted on April 12, 2004 15:57
Claude: Yes, that was one of the factors. Some of the others included fact that the American army was almost purely offensive-minded (in this case, this means that not enough thought and planning went into defensive measures in case of a counter-attack), the belief that Germany was ripe for a "knockout" blow and had little offensive capability left, and that the the Germans had not initiated a winter offensive in a couple hundred years.
Not to mention the code-breaking abilities of the Allies. It never seemed to occur to them that the Germans might eschew radio and land-lines in favor of couriers, just to ensure security.
Then there was the fact that Allied intelligence, basically, lost track of nearly a half-million men.
So when the offensive began, the Allies were caught nearly flat-footed.
I don't recall '68 estimates of VC strength offhand, but the record shows that the Viet Cong suffered terrible losses every time they ever tried conventional tactics against the Americans.
Frankly, the VC were fools to challenge the US in a conventional battle. According to Mao this should have been the time for the fish to disappear into the sea, and fall back to guerilla tactics. America was confident precisely because the VC were losing ground in the "hearts and minds" of the people by 1968. In fact, Tet '68 can be considered the real birth of South Vietnam, as it finally gave rise to a real sense of nationality that the south had lacked before, as they (very) successfully beat off the VC/NVA offensive.
So, while the numbers may have been off, once the VC came out of the shadows, they were decimated. Which, BTW, is exactly what happned in Iraq as well. Those Sadr gun-boyz aren't worth diddly against the United States Marines.
As for "lead to believe," some of us know how to sniff around the internet and not just follow Reuters, et. al. :)
Mark and Craig also have cogent points. Thanks, guys.
Claude, I can sympathize with your POV. I was sixteen when Saigon fell, and I literally grew up watching the war on television.
It was not a pleasant experience.
It took me a long time to drill down past the "imperialist warmongers" vs. "won the war in the field but lost it in the media" hype, but I think I have a basic grasp, now. But even that would take a small book to explain, alas.
So I'll disagree with your interpretation of incompetance and lies, if you don't mind, as I find that a bit too simplistic. :)
Let's just say that the Vietnam War is a classic example of how not to fight a war.
shep: agreed, to a great degree. But my main point has always been that (to use your phrasing) one cannot determine -ahead of time- "clear necessity" nor the "best plan and support possible."
The best we can do is project general trends, and even that's on the order of "for every 100,000 troops, so many vehicles will break down, so many rations will be needed," and so on. Relatively simple stuff. The political element is even less subject to such analysis.
In fact, the reason I termed the MacNamara movie title ironic is that "Mac" was the perfect example of deterministic systems personified; Operational Research Uber Alles; the end result of a century's worth of pathological belief in the "perfect plan." If we have the proper plan then we cannot be beaten.
Robert MacNamara was, in fact, the precise opposite of historically-based methods of wargaming conflicts. He, too, concerned himself with the "best plan."
Posted by Casey Tompkins | April 13, 2004 4:16 AM
Posted on April 13, 2004 04:16
Not to beat a dead horse, but the post-war histories from the NVA side make it clear that the US military neither understated VC strength nor overstated their losses. What the intelligence establishment missed in Tet '68 was the willingness of a weakened enemy to launch a suicidal attempt at a general uprising.
The prevailing sentiment in the American press in 1968-- that the Pentagon was making no progress, that the VC was gaining strength-- was just wrong. The journalists blew it. They, not the military, misjudged those issues.
Posted by craig henry | April 13, 2004 11:28 AM
Posted on April 13, 2004 11:28